Eliciting Unverifiable Information: Behavioral Incentive Compatibility and Complexity (JMP)
(Draft Coming Soon)
Survey data are a key source of information in the social sciences and provide valuable insights into individuals’ unverifiable preferences and behaviors. However, their reliability can be questioned, as respondents often treat hypothetical choices differently from real, binding ones. We test a novel mechanism for eliciting unverifiable information, the choice matching mechanism, in a verifiable environment. Additionally, evaluate two critical assumptions for the theoretical incentive compatibility of elicitation methods based on scoring rules, the stochastic relevance and impersonal updating assumptions. The results are puzzling: while choice matching fails to eliminate hypothetical bias, we find evidence supporting both assumptions. A key insight from this study is that subjects not only make different choices in hypothetical environments compared to binding environments, but also hold systematically different beliefs about the distribution of others’ choices.
This paper examines how the order in which decisions are made impacts outcomes in coordination settings. Theoretically, we highlight that outcomes become more predictable and efficient when decisions are made sequentially rather than simultaneously. Experimental evidence supports this prediction, showing the sequential move framework is less sensitive to increases in strategic uncertainty. Additional dynamic measures reveal that the lack of resilience to setbacks is driving coordination failures in the simultaneous environment. Importantly, we find that the sequential structure alters the allocation of strategic uncertainty in a group, shifting most of it to the first-mover.
A penny for your thoughts? Incentive design and inflation expectations elicitation (with Sergii Drobot, Daniela Puzzello, Ryan Rholes, and Alena Wabitsch)