Eliciting Unverifiable Information: Behavioral Incentive Compatibility and Complexity
(Draft Coming Soon)
Survey data is a key source of information for the social sciences and allows us to learn about subjects’ unverifiable preferences and habits. However, its reliability can be questioned since respondents often treat hypothetical choices differently from real, binding choices. We test a novel mechanism for eliciting unverifiable information, the choice matching mechanism, in a verifiable environment, and collect information that allows us to assess the validity of a critical assumption in most choice elicitation mechanisms based on scoring rules, impersonal updating. The results are puzzling; choice matching fails to eliminate hypothetical bias, although we find evidence in favor of the impersonal updating assumption. A key insight is that not only the choices differ in hypothetical vs binding environments, but so do the subjective beliefs about the distribution of choices.
Strategic Uncertainty and Sequential Play (with Ala Avoyan)
(Draft Coming Soon, Available Upon Request)
This paper examines how the order in which decisions are made impacts outcomes in coordination settings. Theoretically, we highlight that outcomes become more predictable and efficient when decisions are made sequentially rather than simultaneously. Experimental evidence supports this prediction, showing the sequential move framework is less sensitive to increases in strategic uncertainty. Additional dynamic measures reveal that the lack of resilience to setbacks is driving coordination failures in the simultaneous environment. Importantly, we find that the sequential structure alters the allocation of strategic uncertainty in a group, shifting most of it to the first-mover.
A penny for your thoughts? Incentive design and inflation expectations elicitation (with Sergii Drobot, Daniela Puzzello, Ryan Rholes, and Alena Wabitsch)